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JUDICIAL LAW MAKING AND ADMINISTRATION

Roger C. Cramton,CornellLaw School

Seventy years ago in St. Paul, Roscoe Pound
gave a famous speech on "The Causesof Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice." Recently, a prestigiousgroupof lawyersand
judges, assembled by Chief Justice Burger,reconvened in St. Paul to reconsiderPound's theme. A
surprisingconclusion was that, although the professionals - the lawyers and judges themselveshave many problems with the administrationof
justice, the tide of popular dissatisfactionis at a
relativelylow ebb.
In contrast to other agencies of the government, the people have confidence in the fairness
and integrity of the courts. True, there is continuing complaint over the law's cost and delay. But,
apart from this perennial complaint, popular dissatisfaction appearsto stem from two perceptions:
first, that decisions in criminal cases turn too
often upon procedural technicalities rather than
upon the guilt or innocence of the offender; and
second, that some judges, and especially the federal judiciary, have been too actively engaged in
lawmakingon social and economic issues that are
better handled by other institutions of government. The layman, on scanninghis newspaperor
viewing the television screen, discovers to his
surprisethat judges are runningschools and prison
systems, prescribing curricula, formulating budgets, and regulatingthe environment.
Causation is a tricky matter. A student theme
has reported that, since Smokey the Bear posters
were displayed in the New York subways, forest
fires have disappearedin Manhattan.Despite the
risks, I hazard the generalization that several
fundamental changes in the nature of our society
may have alteredthe role of the judiciary.
Foremost among those changes is that suggested by the title of this article. The Leviathanis
upon us, and it has implications for all branches
of government, including the judiciary. Government now attempts so much! Every technical,
economic, and social issue seems to end up in the
hands of government;and the demand for further
government action is combined with chargesthat
existing government is inefficient, heavy-handed,
and ineffective. This is one field in which the
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appetite for nostrums does not fade with the demonstrated failure of prior cures. Each reformer,
after criticizing the failure and inefficiency of
government, then concludes that the remedy is more of the same!
But our attitudes about ourselves and about
conflict have also changed. The confrontational
style of contemporaryAmericaassuresthat social
conflict will increase. "Doing your own thing" is
the central value of a hedonistic, self-regarding
society; and patience is a nearly extinct virtue.
Nowadays no one takes "no" for an answer,
whether it is a job aspirantor a welfare claimantor
a teacher who has been denied tenure. Weperceive
our society as having grown old; the enthusiastic
and venturesome spirit that prompted the unchartedgrowthof the Americanpast is now suffering from hardeningof the arteries.As we experience slower economic development and approach
zero population growth, organizedgroupscontend
with each other with increasingferocity for larger
shares of a more static pie. There is a declining
sense of a common purpose;the prevailingattitude
is "what'sin it for me?"
These trends give lawyers and judges an even
more central role in our society than they have
had in the past. The decline of moral consensus
and of institutions of less formal control, such as
the family and the church, places much more
strain on the law as an instrument of conflict
resolution and social control. And the increasing
contentiousness of groups organized for their
own advantage has made conflict resolution a
growth industry. If you could buy stock in law
firms, I would adviseyou to do so. Lawyershave a
legal monopoly on the conflict resolutionindustry,
and it is the boom industryof today.
To these developments- the increasingreliance
on law as an instrumentof social control and the
rapid growth of group conflict - must be added
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anotherfactor: the failureof the executive and the
legislature to meet the challenge of today's inflated expectations. The public perception that
these branchesof governmenthave failed - a perception greatly abetted by the debacles of Vietnam and Watergate- has led the people to turn
increasingly to the courts for solutions to their
problems.
Modelsof JudicialReview
Considerin the context of the LeviathanState
two models of judicial review of administrative
action. The traditionalmodel is one of a restrained
and sober second look at what governmenthas
done that adversely affects a citizen. The controversy is bipolar in character,with two parties opposing each other; the issues are narrowand welldefined; and the relief is limited and obvious. Has
a welfare recipient been denied a benefit to which
he is entitled by statute? Wasfair procedureemployed by the agency? Wereconstitutional rights
violated?
Judicial reviewin this model servesas a window
on the outside world, a societal escape valvewhich
tests the self-interest and narrow vision of the
specialist and the bureaucratagainst the broader
premises of the total society. Every bureaucracy
develops its own way of looking at things and
these belief patterns are enormously resistant to
change. In time an agency acquiresa tunnel vision
in which particularvalues are advancedand others
are ignored. An independentjudiciarytests agency
outcomes againstthe statutory frameworkand the
broaderlegal context.
Judicialreviewin this form is an absolute essential, especially in a society in which the points of
contact between officials and private individuals
multiply at every point. The impartialand objective second look adds to the integrity and acceptance of the administrativeprocess rather than
underminingit. If the administratoris upheld, as
usually is the case, citizen confidence in the fairness and rationality of administrationis enhanced.
In the relatively small number of cases in which
the administratoris reversed,the administratoris
forced to readjusthis narrowerview to the larger
perspectiveof the total society.
During the last 20 years the pace of constitutional change, especially in judicial review of government action, has been astounding. The values
implicit in general constitutional provisions such
as due process, equal protection, and free speech

have been given expanded content and new life.
Even more important, constitutional rights have
been extended to persons who were formerly
neglected by the legal system - blacks, aliens,
prisoners, and others. One can disagreewith the
merits of particular decisions. But the general
trends - implementation of fundamental values
by the courts and the inclusion of previouslyexcluded groups in the applicationof these valuesconstitute a great hour in the long struggle for
human freedom.
There is, however, a second model of judicial
reviewthat is growingin acceptanceand authority.
This model of the judicial role has characteristics
more of general problem-solvingthan of dispute
resolution. Simon Rifkind speaks of a modern
tendency to view courts as modern handymen asjacks of all tradesavailableto furnishthe answer
to whatever may trouble us. "Whatis life? When
does death begin? How should we operateprisons
and hospitals?Shallwe build nuclearpower plants,
and if so, where? Shall the Concorde fly to our
shores?"'
Thoughtful observersbelieve that controversies
of this characterstrainthe capacitiesof our courts
and may have debilitating effects on the selfreliance of administratorsand legislators. At the
risk of appearingmore reactionarythan I am, let
me focus not on the achievementsof the past but
on the possible dangers that arise when the judiciary succumbs to pressures to attempt too
much.
The Courtas Administrator
The traditionaljudicial role, earlier described,
envisions a lawsuit which is bipolar in character,
seeks traditional relief (usually damages), and
applies established law to a relatively narrow
factual situation. The relief given is backwardlooking and does not order government officials
to take positive steps in the future.
The traditionalmodel still persistsin much private litigation and in many routine cases challenging official action, but in many other constitutional and statutory controversiesradicalchanges
have occurred. The changes have led Abram
Chayes to argue that the basic characterof public
litigation has changed.2 In today's public litigation, a federal judge often is dealing with issues
involving numerous parties; indeed, everyone in
the community may be affected. Moreover,the
issues are complex, interrelated,and multi-faceted;
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and they turn less on proof concerningpast misconduct than on complex predictions as to how
various social interests should be protected in the
future. Since the remedyis not limited to compensating named plaintiffs for a past harm, the judge
gets drawn, for example, into coercing school
officials to close schools, bus pupils, changecurricula, and build new facilities. The federaljudge becomes one of the most powerful persons in the
community; on the particularissue, he is the one
who decides.
Consider the role of one man, FrankJohnson,
in the governanceof the once sovereignState of
Alabama. Johnson, a distinguishedUnited States
District Judge in Alabama, is supervising the
operation of the prisons, mental hospitals, highway patrol, and other institutions of the state.
His decrees have directed the state to hire more
wardens with better training, rebuild the prisons,
and even extend to such details as the length of
exercise periods and the installation of partitions
in the men's rooms.
Whatis the authority of a federaljudge to take
such far-reachingactions? Why isn't the Alabama
legislature the proper body to determine what
prison or hospital care should be provided,and at
what cost, through agencies administeredby the
state's executive branch? The answer is that all
of these actions are designed to remedyviolations
of the constitutional rights of prisoners,mental
patients, and others. And the Alabamalegislature
and executive have defaulted on their obligation
to remedy these violations.
We are caught on the horns of a terrible dilemma. It is unconscionable that a federal court
should refuse to entertain claims that state officials have systematically violated the constitutional rights of prisoners, mental patients, or
school children. On the other hand, the design of
effective relief may draw the court into a continuing role as an administratorof complex bureaucratic institutions. The dangersof the latter choice
are worth brief exploration.
First, the judge who assumesan administrative
role may graduallylose his neutrality, becoming
a partisan who is pursuinghis own cause. In one
recent class action, a federal judge not only appointed expert witnesses, suggested areas of inquiry, and took over from the partiesa substantial
degree of the managementof the case, but also
went so far as to order that $250,000 from an
awardrequiredof the defendantsbe paid for social
science researchon the effectivenessof the decree.
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That may be good government, but is it judicial
justice?
A further problem arisesfrom the tentativeness
of our knowledge about such mattersas minimum
standardsin operatinga prisonor mental hospital.
We fervently hope that civilized and humane
treatmentwill be provided to all of those who are
confined to public institutions. But is it desirable
to take the view of the currentgenerationof experts, especially those self-selected by the plaintiffs or the judge, and to give their views of acceptable standardsthe status of constitutionalrequirements, with all that implies concerningtheir fixed
meaningand difficulty of change?
Here as elsewhere, our capacity to anticipate
the future or to discern all relevantfacets of polycentric problems is limited. Thus, for example,
when a federal judge ordered New York City to
close the Tombs as a city jail or to rebuild it, the
City, faced with an extraordinaryfinancial crisis,
opted to close it and prisoners confined to the
Tombs were transferred to Riker's Island. The
crowded conditions of the Tombs were immediately duplicated on Riker's Island. But a further
result was not anticipated:Riker's Island is much
less accessible to the families and attorneys of
prisoners;and there is reason to believe that the
vast majority of prisoners prefer the convenience
of the Tombs, despite its problems, to the inaccessibilityof Riker'sIsland.
The underlying truth is that court orders cannot by judicial decree achieve social change in
the face of the concerted opposition of elected
officials and public opinion. In a representative
democracy, the consent of the people is required
for lastingchange.
The impulseto reform,moreover,is not limited
to courts nor to constitutional law. A vigilant
press, an informed populace, and the leadershipof
a committed minority have mobilized forces of
change and reform throughout our history. A representative democracy may move slowly, but if
we lack patience we may undermine the selfreliance and responsibilityof the people and their
elected officials.
The dangerof confrontation between branches
of government is yet another concern. Whathappens, for example, if Alabamarefuses to fund its
mental hospitals or prisons at the level required
to achieve the standardsspecified in Judge Johnson's decrees? The next step, Judge Johnson has
said, is the sale of Alabama'spublic lands in order
to finance, through court-appointedofficers, the
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necessarychanges.
A degree of tension is a necessaryconcomitant
of the checks and balances of a federal system.
But in our urgeto check we should not forget that
balance is involved as well. One of the lessons of
the Watergateera is that cooperation, restraint,
and patience among the various branches and
levels of government is necessaryif our system is
to survive in the long run. As Ben Franklin said
many years ago, we must hang together or we will
hang separately.
Pressuresfor JudicialAction
Why have the courts undertakenthese more expansive functions? They have not done so as volunteers desirous of expanding their own powers,
but reluctantly and hesitantly in response to public demands for effective implementation of generallyheld values.
The Americanpeople today have little patience
or restraintin dealingwith social issues. An instant
problem requiresan instant solution that provides
instant gratification.Playingthis gameunder those
rules, the executive and legislaturehave done their
best - grindingout thousands of laws and regulations, many of them ineffective and some of them
intrusive and harmful. The public, while demanding even more action from legislatorsand administrators, perceivesthese bodies as inept, ineffective,
and even corrupt.Moreover,issues on which there
is a deep social division, such as school busing or
abortion, are avoided by elected officials, who
view them as involvingunacceptablepolitical risks.
Nature abhorsa vacuumand the inaction of the
executive and lawmaking branches creates pressuresfor judicial action. A prominentfederaljudge
put it succinctly at the recent St. Paul conference:
"If there is a serious problem, and the legislature
and executive don't respond, the courts have to
act."
And they have done so on one after another
burningissue. The mystery is that they have been
so successful and that there has been so little
popular outcry. The desegregation of Southern
schools, of course, is a success story of heroic
proportions. Legislative reapportionment is also
generally viewed as a success despite the mathematical extreme to which it was carriedin its later
years. Organs of opinion, especially the TV networks and major newspapers,support the Court's
actions in general and especially in such areas as
civil rights and criminal procedure. There is no

institution in our society that has as good a press
as the SupremeCourt.Judicialactivism,it appears,
has the approvalof the intellectual elite who have
become disillusioned with the effectiveness of
social change by other means. It is more doubtful,
however, whetherthe common man concurseither
in the elite's support of judicial lawmakingor of
its substantiveresults.
Long-TermEffects
Neither popular acclaim nor criticism, of
course, can answer the long-termquestion of the
appropriatelawmaking role of the judiciary and
the desirable limits on the scope of judicial decrees. More fundamental considerationsmust be
decisive.
First, the practical question of comparative
qualifications.Do judges, by training,selection, or
experience, have an aptitude for social problem
solving that other officials of government lack?
And are the techniques of adjudicationwell designed to perform these broader policy-making
functions? ProfessorAbramChayesof the Harvard
Law School has answered these questions with a
confident affirmative.3 I am inclined to disagree.
Second, what will be the long-term effects of
this trend on the credibility of the courts and on
the sense of responsibility of administratorsand
legislators?
After completion of this article, my fears on
this score receivedsupportfrom an unlikely source
- Anthony Lewis in the New York Times. After
acknowledging, as I do, that the Boston School
Case "presented exceptional difficulties," that "a
judge could [not] in conscience remit the complaining black families to their political remedy,"
and that District Judge Garrity's lonely efforts
should be viewed with sympathy, Lewis nevertheless concludes that Garrity's involvement in the
day-by-day administrationof school affairs "has
not worked well" and "is a serious philosophical
error:"
American judges have to handle many controversial problems with political implications - redistricting, prisons
and the like. Their object should always be to nudge
elected officials into performing their responsibility.
[Excessive intervention by the judge] tends to take
responsibility away from those who ought to be seen to
bear it4

And finally, as Simon Rifkind has put it, there
is "the ancient question, quo warranto?By what
authority do judges turn courts into mini-legis-
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latures?"5
The critical question in a republicis how government by nonelected, lifetime officials can be
squaredwith representativedemocracy.The magic
of the robe, the remnantsof the myth that law on
these matters is discoveredby an elaboration of
existing rules (ratherthan by personalpreference),
and the prudence of the judiciary in picking
issues on which it could command a great deal of
popular support - perhaps these factors explain
why the judges have been as successful as they
have.
I fear, however, that the judiciary has exhausted the areaswhere broadmajoritariansupportwill
sustain new initiatives and that the tolerance of
local communities for "governmentby decree" is
fast dissipating. If so, caution is in order lest a
depreciation of the esteem in which we hold the
courts underminestheir performanceof the essential tasks that are indisputably theirs and that
other institutions cannot perform.
The authority of the courts depends in large
part on the public perception that judges are
different from other policy makers. Judges (but
not elected officials) are impartial rather than
willful or partisan;judges utilize special decisional
procedures;and they draw on establishedgeneral
principles in deciding individual cases. In short,
traditionalideas concerningthe nature, form, and
functions of adjudicationas a decisionaltechnique
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underliepopularacceptanceof judicial outcomes.
While the preciseboundariesof the adjudicative
technique are flexible rather than fixed, if they
are abandoned entirely the judge loses credibility
as a judge. He becomes merely another policy
maker who, in managing prisons or schools or
whatnot, is expressing his personal views and
throwing his weight around. When that point is
reached, the judge's credibilityand authority is no
greater than that of Mayor White in Boston or
MayorRizzo in Philadelphia.
With the credibility of the legislature and
executive branches of government in such disrepair, we cannot afford any further depreciation
in the judicial currency. General acceptance of
the authority of law is a necessarybulwarkof our
otherwise fragile social order. If it disappears,the
resulting collapse of order may put the American
people in the mood for that "more effective management" which is likely to characterizeany distinctly Americanbrandof authoritarianism.
Opportunitiesfor charismaticand authoritarian
leadership,it has been said, derive in considerable
measure from the ability to "accentuate [a society's] sense of being in a desperate predicament." If the courts, by overextensionand consequent failure, contribute to our growingsense of
desperation, our liberties may not long survive.
When a people despairof their institutions, force
arrivesunderthe masqueradeof ideology.

Votes
1 Simon H. Rifkind, "Are We Asking Too Much of Our
Courts?" paper prepared for the National Conference
on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, St. Paul, Minn., April 8, 1976,
p. 5.
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2. Abram Chayes, "The Role of the Judiciary in a Public
Law System," Harvard Law Review (May 1976).

3. Op. cit. n. 2, supra.

4. New York Times, May 24, 1976, p. 29.
5. Rifkind, op. cit. n. 1, supra, p. 20.

